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Job prospects for former Supreme Court law clerks have radically
changed in recent years. Beginning in 1986, skyrocketing law firm
signing bonuses caused a transformation from the natural sorting system,
where clerks chose among private practice, government, academic, and
public interest positions, to a Bonus Baby Regime where former clerks
almost always choose to work in private firms after they leave the Court.
This development is a result of both financial and ideological factors.
While the more conservative clerking corps of recent years has been
increasingly drawn to private practice, the firms themselves hire along
ideological lines. Still, while former clerks have largely eschewed nonlaw-firm positions at the start, most clerks are not shackled by golden
handcuffs and leave their first jobs after two years. Thus, the new breed
of bonus babies has unprecedented career options—both lucrative and
prestigious—in a way that their predecessors never had.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The term “bonus baby”—once derisively used to describe young,
unproven baseball players—has taken on a new meaning in recent
years: it now describes the group of Supreme Court law clerks who
choose to work for the elite law firms that are willing to pay them
exorbitant bonuses and salaries.1 This relatively recent development—
which we argue began in 1986—has transformed the career paths of
former High Court clerks who once chose equally between a slightly
more lucrative private practice job and a slightly less lucrative
government, academic, or public interest position to one where only a
dwindling minority of clerks can resist passing up the considerable spoils
of a law firm offer.
There has been a growing body of research on Supreme Court law
clerks in recent years, with much of it suggesting that during their
tenures at the Court clerks exert an ideological or partisan influence on
the institution.2 Yet there is relatively little research on what happens to

1. See David Lat, The Supreme Court’s Bonus Babies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/18/opinion/18lat.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R8FLAT6L.
2. See, e.g., TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES (Todd C. Peppers & Artemus Ward
eds., 2012); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006); Ryan C. Black &
Christina L. Boyd, The Role of Law Clerks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting
Process, 40 AM. POL. RES. 147 (2012); Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Research Note,
Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S. Supreme Court, 63 J. POL. 869 (2001);
Todd C. Peppers & Christopher Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision
Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (2008).
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clerks after they leave the Court.3 A recent study examined postclerkship employment for 90% of Supreme Court clerks from the
inception of the clerkship institution to the start of the Roberts Court
(1882–2006).4 The authors traced how the Supreme Court clerkship
changed from a relatively non-partisan institution to one where “the
careers of former clerks show striking trends of political polarization in
the recent history of the clerkship with regard to the legal academy,
government service, and private practice.”5 Like these authors, we also
explore the question of political polarization but do so in an intraregime context—one transformed by signing bonuses and
unprecedented demand for Supreme Court clerks.6 We also update the
analysis by, for the first time, examining the behavior of Roberts Court
clerks. Specifically, we compare data on the post-clerkship choices of
the clerks of the Roberts Court (2005–2011) compared to their
predecessors—the clerks of the Rehnquist Court (1986–2004).7 Thus,
we exclude the relatively non-partisan years—at least in terms of postclerkship career paths—of prior Courts. We explore the types of
positions clerks took: private practice, government, academia, and
public interest. We examine whether the choices made by clerks reflect
ideological or partisan preferences, as measured by the Justices the
clerks worked for.
Ultimately, we find that there has been a marked increase in recent
years of clerks choosing to enter private practice.8 We suggest this is a
result of both financial and ideological developments. Specifically, the

3. See KEVIN T. MCGUIRE, THE SUPREME COURT BAR: LEGAL ELITES IN THE
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY 161–70 (1993); William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott
Messinger & Michael Jo, The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall,
and Reincarnation?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 1780–95 (2009) [hereinafter The Liberal
Tradition]; William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo, The
Supreme Court Clerkship and the Polarization of the Court: Can the Polarization Be Fixed?,
13 GREEN BAG 2D 59, 60–66 (2009).
4. The Liberal Tradition, supra note 3, at 1753.
5. Id.
6. See Dahlia Lithwick, Bonus Round: What to Make of Those Astronomical Supreme
Court Signing Bonuses?, SLATE (Mar. 10, 2007, 7:48 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/jurisprudence/2007/03/bonus_round.html, archived at http://perma.cc/48MPRAZ5.
7. There were 902 Supreme Court clerks, including clerks for retired Justices, who
served at the Court from 1986–2011. We were able to find employment information for 817
(91%) using internet sources such as martindale.com, Linkedin.com, and law school and law
firm websites.
8. See infra Figure 2.
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explosion of signing bonuses for Supreme Court clerks has made private
practice even more financially attractive than it already was.9 Also, a
more conservative clerking corps, the result of a more conservative
Court, has been less interested in positions outside of private practice,
with government and public interest work on the decline.10 Still, most
clerks leave their first jobs, and those who initially choose private
practice are as likely to decide to stay in that sector in another firm as
they are to switch to government work or academia.11 And while the
attraction of private practice may, at first glance, seem to suggest that
recent clerks are behaving in a less ideological—and perhaps more
rational—way, the law firms that hire clerks do so along ideological or
partisan lines.12

II. THE BONUS BABY REGIME:
THE RISE OF PRIVATE PRACTICE AND THE DECLINE OF
GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC, AND PUBLIC INTEREST JOBS
From the beginning of the clerkship institution at the end of the
nineteenth century through the present day, former Supreme Court law
clerks have parlayed their apprenticeships with the Justices into
positions in private practice, government, academia, and public interest
organizations.13 Historically, clerks made these choices based on their
individual interests—termed a “natural sorting process” by Carter
Phillips, a 1978 clerk for Chief Justice Warren Burger who went on to
become a managing partner at the law firm Sidley Austin.14 Yet in 1986,
Phillips unwittingly changed the Natural Sorting Regime. He sought to
hire a few Supreme Court clerks whom he was particularly impressed
with and offered them $5,000–$10,000 bonuses to sign a contract with
his firm.15 As a result, the legal equivalent of the bonus baby was born.
He recalled, “I think I’m the person who came up with this cockamamie
idea in the first place . . . . I’ll take the heat for creating this system. But

9. See Lithwick, supra note 6.
10. See infra Figures 2, 3, 6 & 7.
11. See infra Figures 11, 12 & 13.
12. See infra Figures 14 & 15.
13. See Peppers & Zorn, supra note 2, at 55.
14. Lithwick, supra note 6; Joan Biskupic, Lawyers Emerge as Supreme Court
Specialists, USA TODAY, May 16, 2003, at 6A.
15. Lithwick, supra note 6.
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I was never the market leader for driving it up.”16 In an effort to
compete, other firms began matching or exceeding existing bonuses, and
the dollar amounts slowly rose through the 1990s as firms competed for
clerks who sought private practice jobs.17 Though the amounts were
rising, the bonuses were still not enough to entice at least some clerks
from eschewing preferred academic, government, or public interest law
work for private practice. Tim Wu, an academic who clerked for Justice
Stephen Breyer in 1999, said, “I’m sort of glad we didn’t have [an
exorbitant] bonus in my day . . . . Money like that leaves you no option.
In my case, it would have ruined my career.”18
Yet by the early 2000s, the demand for former clerks only escalated
as law firms ramped up their recruiting of former clerks, specialized
appellate and Supreme Court practices began developing, and signing
bonuses began to explode.19 In May 2006, Thomas C. Goldstein said,
“The [bonus] explosion . . . happened about four or five years ago
because of the prestige factor that comes with a Supreme Court clerk,
and the pool is not that big.”20 At the same time, Washington Post
journalist Charles Lane reported:
The law firms’ scramble for Supreme Court clerks
became so intense a couple of years ago that firms began
inviting the entire clerk class en masse to expensive
dinner receptions.
The justices, concerned about
appearances, put a stop to it, according to lawyers and
former clerks.
Now, each individual justice sets rules for when and
how his or her clerks can get in touch with firms, though
all agree that clerks may not talk to firms that have
matters pending before the court.21

16. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
17. See id.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See Tom Goldstein, The Expansion of the “Supreme Court Bar,” SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 2, 2006, 11:32 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/03/the-expansion-of-the-supremecourt-bar, archived at http://perma.cc/8B5M-D3X3; Lithwick, supra note 6.
20. Charles Lane, Former Clerks’ Signing Bonuses Rival Salaries on the High Court,
WASH. POST, May 15, 2006, at A15 (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id.
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Figure 1 shows the first post-clerkship jobs held by Supreme Court
clerks during the Bonus Baby Regime. Two-thirds (68%) went directly
from the Court to positions in private practice. On one level this is not a
surprising finding given that the vast majority of law school graduates go
into private practice22 and the large salaries and signing bonuses offered
to former Supreme Court clerks make this option difficult to resist. For
example, in August 2013, clerks heading to New York, Washington
D.C., and San Francisco received $300,000 signing bonuses from such
firms as Gibson Dunn, Jones Day, Munger Tolles, Paul Weiss, Skadden
Arps, and Sullivan & Cromwell.23 One year later, signing bonuses
increased to $330,000 at Kellogg Huber and reportedly others.24 Given
that the starting salaries for third-year associates—the rank at which
former clerks generally enter the firm—are well into the six figures with
additional year-end bonuses of six figures, former clerks can earn more
than half a million dollars in their first post-clerkship year.25 Not a bad
haul, considering that the Justice they clerked for is making less than
half that to sit on the highest court in the land.26

22. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, 2012
LAW GRADUATE EMPLOYMENT DATA, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/da
m/aba/administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/reports/law_grad_employ
ment_data.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DZ92-97J9.
23. David Lat, It’s Official: Supreme Court Clerkship Bonuses Hit A New High, ABOVE
THE LAW (Aug. 15, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/08/its-official-supremecourt-clerkship-bonuses-hit-a-new-high/, archived at http://perma.cc/E7BB-SLYQ.
24. David Lat, Supreme Court Clerk Hiring Watch: Into 2016 We Go—Plus SCOTUS
Clerk Bonus News, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 9, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/0
9/supreme-court-clerk-hiring-watch-into-2016-we-go-plus-scotus-clerk-bonus-news/ (last
updated Sept. 10, 2014, 1:30 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/FX4P-7Q2X.
25. Law Firms’ Signing Bonuses: Supreme Desire, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2013, at 56
[hereinafter Supreme Desire].
26. In 2013, the Chief Justice’s salary was $224,618, with his colleagues each making
$214,969. Id.
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Figure 1
U.S. Supreme Court Law Clerks:
First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011
80%
70%

68%

60%
50%
40%
30%
17%

20%
12%
10%

3%
0%
Private Practice Academic (n=86)
(n=494)

Government
(n=126)

Public Interest
(n=21)

233

234

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:227

In addition to the firms just mentioned, there are many more that
routinely compete for Supreme Court clerks.27 Carter Phillips explained
the competition: “Law firms are like lemmings—they all walk off the
cliff together . . . . One year a firm would be more aggressive, and then
the other firms are willing to match the best offer out there.”28 Beth
Heifetz, a partner at Jones Day and a 1985 law clerk for Justice Harry
Blackmun, explained why clerks are in demand: “We have found it’s a
terrific investment for us . . . . They are incredibly smart, and they’re up
on big issues in the law . . . . They have this unique view of how judges
think, of how the justices interact.”29 Neal Katyal, a partner at Hogan
Lovells and 1996 clerk for Justice Stephen Breyer, said that clients ask
for specific former clerks by name, which “is ultimately going to benefit
the bottom line of the firm.”30 Though billable hours are important, the
main reason clerks are sought after is because having former clerks on
staff lends firms the prestige they need to attract high-paying clients.31
Still, despite the feeding frenzy promulgated by these firms, onethird of clerks during the Bonus Baby Regime have chosen to forego
this payday for positions in government (17%), academia (12%), and
“other” (3%) areas—largely public interest.32 Orin Kerr, a former clerk
for Justice Anthony Kennedy in 2003, said, “I never really thought
about going to a law firm . . . . I’m an academic and looked forward to
going back.”33 But it appears to be getting harder to resist becoming a
bonus baby. Figures 2 and 3 make plain that the trends are
unmistakable: greater numbers of clerks are forgoing government,
academic, and public interest jobs in favor of private practice and the
bonuses that go along with it.

27. See infra Figure 14.
28. Brent Kendall, High-Court Clerks Attract a Frenzy: Law Firms Offer Signing
Bonuses That Exceed Justices’ Pay, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2012, at B1 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Beth Heifetz, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesd
ay.com/bheifetz/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/58E-PGSG.
30. Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted); Peter Lattman, Law
Blog Lawyer of the Day: Neal Katyal, WALL ST. J.L. BLOG (June 19, 2006, 10:43 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/06/29/law-blog-lawyer-of-the-day-neal-katyal/, archived at http://perm
a.cc/4JET-Y8H9.
31. See Kendall, supra note 28.
32. See supra Figure 1.
33. Lane, supra note 20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Figure 2
Bonus Baby Regime Trends:
Private Practice v. Government Jobs, 1986–2011
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Figure 3
Bonus Baby Regime Trends:
Academic and Public Interest Jobs, 1986–2011
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Figure 2 illustrates how private practice has become the rule over
time, with 2003 the last year where roughly half the clerks chose
something else at the conclusion of their clerkships. As previously
mentioned, that was also the time when bonuses exploded and clerks
were courted by firms like never before.34 Since then, the percentages
have risen steadily to the point where the final year under study, 2011,
saw a whopping 95% of the clerks choose private practice—an
unprecedented total.35 At the same time, the percentage of clerks
choosing government positions following their clerkships has steadily
declined. As many as one-third of the clerks were still choosing
government work as late as 1995, but in recent years the percentage has
dropped to single digits with a record low of 3% choosing this route in
2011. Figure 3 shows similar declines for both academic and public
interest law work.36 Specifically, the number of clerks choosing
academia following their year at the Court was still one in five as late as
2003. Yet only 3% chose academia in 2011. Public interest law has
always been the least desirable post-clerkship employment choice, but
the downward trend is also present here, with 11% of clerks making this
choice in the mid-1980s compared to none by 2011. These figures make
plain that today there are more bonus babies among Supreme Court
clerks than ever before.
Another way to capture this trend is to compare clerks who served
during the Rehnquist Court (1986–2004) to clerks who served during the
Roberts Court (2005–2011). Figure 4 also shows that there has been a
decided shift, with more clerks choosing private practice in recent years:
64% of Rehnquist Court clerks compared to 81% for Roberts Court
clerks. And while there was a slight decline from Rehnquist to Roberts
in the percentage of clerks choosing academia (12% to 10%) and
other/public interest work (3% to 1%), the real decrease came in clerks
choosing government positions (20% to 8%). There are two possible
explanations for this development. One is the explosion of signing
bonuses. In 2003, near the end of the Rehnquist Court, clerks were
receiving signing bonuses of $85,000.37 The tripling of signing bonuses
over the next decade may not only explain the explosion of clerks
entering private practice but also may have fundamentally changed the

34.
35.
36.
37.

See supra notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
See supra Figure 2.
See supra Figure 3.
Kendall, supra note 28.
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post-clerkship career path for the foreseeable future.38 With firms
setting up specialized appellate—and even Supreme Court—practices,
competition is fierce for former Supreme Court clerks who have
specialized knowledge, have experience, and can immediately begin
working on major cases, even if they are barred from working on
Supreme Court cases for their first two post-clerkship years.39
Figure 4
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:
First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011
90%
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70%

64%

60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
20%

12%

10%

10%

8%
3%

1%

0%
Private Practice

Academic

Government

Public Interest

38. See Lat, supra note 23; Lithwick, supra note 6; Supreme Desire, supra note 25.
39. Supreme Desire, supra note 25; see supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.
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Figure 5
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:
Percentage of Clerks Working for Liberal and Conservative Justices,
1986–201140
70%
60%

Rehnquist Court (n=547)
Roberts Court (n=180)

63%
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40%

37%

30%
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40. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
BERKELEY L., http://mqscores.berkeley.edu (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/MZA5-KKBJ.
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Another reason for the growing number of clerks choosing private
practice is that the Court has become more conservative under Chief
Justice Roberts—particularly with the replacement of Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor with Justice Samuel Alito—and the Justices are hiring
more conservative clerks who in turn may be more likely to seek
employment in private practice. Figure 5 shows that there are in fact
more clerks working for conservative Justices during the Roberts Court
(63%) than there were during the Rehnquist years (57%). While that
increase is not enough to explain the burst of private practice hiring in
recent years, it may be part of the picture.
Figure 6
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology, 1986–201141
80%
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Conservative (n=424)
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41. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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In fact, as Figure 6 illustrates, clerks who worked for conservative
Justices were more likely to enter private practice (73%) than were
clerks who worked for liberal Justices (61%). Interestingly, the
percentage going into government work is nearly identical (18% and
17%), while clerks for liberal Justices are more likely to choose
academia (15% v. 10%) and other/public interest (6% v. 0.5%) than
were clerks for conservative Justices. These results suggest that there is
an ideological element to post-clerkship career paths. Figures 7 and 8
break down these overall results by Court. As with the overall trend,
Figure 7 shows that during the Rehnquist years, clerks for conservative
Justices were more likely to go into private practice (68%) than were
clerks for liberal Justices (58%). Clerks for liberal Justices during the
Rehnquist years were more likely to work in academia (15% v. 11%)
and other/public interest law (7% v. 1%), while government work was
essentially evenly divided (20% v. 21%).42 Figure 8 illustrates how the
Roberts Court reflects the overall trend that clerks for conservative
Justices are more apt to go into private practice (88%) than are clerks
for liberal justices (70%). Yet the percentages for both are much higher
than they were under Chief Justice Rehnquist, indicating that a bonus
baby shift has occurred.
Interestingly, the shift to greater private practice employment that is
present for clerks from both liberal and conservative Justices is not
consistent across other categories.43 The one constant is that clerks for
liberal Justices chose academic work at a consistent rate (15%) across
both the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. But under Chief Justice
Roberts, clerks for liberal Justices were much less likely to choose
government (20% v. 12%) or other/public interest (7% v. 3%) work
than they were under Chief Justice Rehnquist. Conversely, clerks for
conservative Justices greatly increased their rate of academic
employment under Chief Justice Roberts (24% v. 11%) and greatly
decreased their rate of government work (5% v. 21%) as compared to
clerks for conservative Justices during the Rehnquist years. These
results suggest that in addition to ideology, the massive monetary
difference between private practice and government work is having an
effect across the board.
Indeed, unlike government employees,
academics are able to supplement their income through consulting,

42. See infra Figure 7.
43. See infra Figures 7 & 8.
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speaking, and writing,44 which may help explain why recent clerks for
conservative Justices are twice as likely to enter academia as they were
in the past.

Figure 7
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology:
Rehnquist Court, 1986–200445
80%
Liberal (n=236)

68%
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44. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.807 (2009).
45. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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Figure 8
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology:
Roberts Court, 2005–201146
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46. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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Figures 9 and 10 provide further illustration of how private practice
has become an increasingly common choice among clerks for both
conservative and liberal Justices. Figure 9 shows how three out of four
clerks for the most conservative Justices of the Rehnquist Court (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas) chose
private practice. But the Court’s two newest conservatives—Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito—have even higher rates of clerks
entering private practice. In fact, with only a single exception, every
clerk for Chief Justice Roberts has gone into private practice.47 Former
Roberts clerk Hagan Scotten explained why he and other clerks
accepted offers from law firms: “Most of us had $100,000 in law-school
debt . . . . Getting rid of that debt is a good way to start.”48
But, the increase in private practice employment is by no means
limited to clerks for conservative Justices. Figure 10 shows a similar
pattern for clerks who worked for liberal Justices who are also
increasingly choosing private practice. Indeed, three out of four clerks
for the last three liberal appointees—Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan—have accepted offers from law firms. This is a significant
change from the clerks for the most liberal Justices of the Rehnquist
Court—Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun—who only chose
private practice half of the time. An example is Elizabeth Prelogar, who
clerked for Justice Ginsburg in 2009 and Justice Kagan in 2010 and
subsequently began working at the law firm Hogan Lovells.49

47. See infra Figure 9.
48. Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id.
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Figure 9
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology:
Conservatives, 1986–201150

(n=424)

50. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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Figure 10
First Post-Clerkship Job by Justice Ideology: Liberals, 1986–201151

(n=303)

51. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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Figures 9 and 10 also show that while there has been an increase in
private practice employment for clerks for both liberal and conservative
Justices, there are a number of differences across the other categories
that suggest that certain Justices are steering many of their clerks away
from or toward government, academic, or public interest careers.52
Justice Byron White placed 57% of his clerks in government positions
during his years on the Rehnquist Court.53 No other Justice even comes
close to these totals, with liberal Rehnquist Court Justices Marshall
(27%), Souter (25%), and Blackmun (23%) placing the next highest
percentage of their clerks in government posts.54 At the other end of the
spectrum, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have placed only 4%
of their clerks in government jobs, with Justices Breyer (9%) and
Brennan (11%) placing the next fewest. In terms of academic jobs,
Justice Marshall had the highest total (27%), followed by Justices
O’Connor (22%) and Ginsburg (17%). Several Justices—Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices White and Kagan—placed no clerks in academic
positions during the period under study, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
(2%) and Justices Scalia (8%) and Thomas (8%) having very few clerks
joining the academy. Finally, Justices Brennan (22%) and Blackmun
(19%) had by far the highest percentage of clerks go into public interest
law work while many Justices had none, including, perhaps surprisingly,
liberal Justices Marshall, Sotomayor, and Kagan and conservative Chief
Justices Rehnquist and Roberts and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito.
Thus, while these findings suggest that there is an ideological or
partisan element to post-clerkship career paths, that tendency has been
somewhat tempered in recent years by the pull of large signing bonuses
for clerks choosing private practice. Yet, as we will demonstrate later in
this Article, law firm hiring also reflects ideological or partisan
differences.55 But what happens to clerks after they secure their first
job? Do they move, and if so, where? What prompts moves from one
job to another? Is there an ideological element to moving to and from
private practice and government work? We turn to these questions in
the next section.

52.
53.
54.
55.

See supra Figures 9 & 10.
See supra Figure 9.
See supra Figure 10.
See infra Figure 15.
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III. ESCAPING THE GOLDEN HANDCUFFS: JOB HOPPING AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL COMPONENT OF LAW FIRM HIRING
There is a school of thought that some clerks choose to avoid private
practice because they may have a difficult time leaving once they get
used to the large salaries and bonuses and the lifestyle that goes with
them. For example, James Stern, who clerked for Justice Anthony
Kennedy in 2010, said,“[it] is a great deal of money to walk away
from . . . . I had some concern about the golden handcuffs—getting
locked in and finding it hard to walk away from the money once I
started down that path.”56 Stern chose academia instead, taking a job at
the University of Virginia.57 Do golden handcuffs keep clerks in private
practice? And how likely are clerks in general to leave their first postclerkship job for another? Figure 11 shows that it is the norm, with two
out of three (65%) clerks leaving their first position for another. Clerks
for liberal Justices are slightly more likely than clerks for conservative
Justices to move (70% v. 62%). Interestingly, nearly half of all clerks
(45%) leave their first job for a position in a different sector, such as
moving from private practice to academia or from government work to
private practice. Again, clerks for liberal Justices are more likely than
clerks for conservative Justices to move to a different sector (53% v.
39%). Yet this also means that there are some clerks (20%) who change
jobs but stay in the same sector, such as moving from a large firm to a
boutique firm or from one academic or government post to another.

56. Kendall, supra note 28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id.
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Figure 11
Percentage of Clerks Moving from First to Second
Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011
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Figure 12
Common Paths from First to Second Post-Clerkship Job:
Different Sector, 1986–2011
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Figure 13
Common Paths from First to Second Post-Clerkship
Job by Justice Ideology, 1986–201158
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58. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.

252

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[98:227

But when clerks change sectors, where do they move and are there
differences between clerks for liberal and conservative Justices? Figure
12 shows the common paths from first to second post-clerkship jobs.
Overall, one out of three clerks who leave their first job (34%) move
from private practice to government work. Similarly, nearly one out of
three clerks (29%) leave private practice for an academic post. Thus,
clerks are most likely to choose private practice for their first job and
will most likely leave that job for another either in a different firm, in
the government, or academia. Thus, while there may be a golden
handcuffs effect for some clerks, it is by no means the norm. Figure 13
shows that there are some ideological or partisan differences when it
comes to career paths. While clerks for both liberal and conservative
Justices move from private practice to academia at a similar rate (30%
v. 29%), clerks for conservative Justices are far more likely to move
from private practice to government jobs than are clerks for liberal
Justices (40% v. 28%). For example, former Roberts clerk Scotten said
that he hoped to return to government service after gaining private
sector experience.59 Conversely, clerks for liberal Justices are more
likely than clerks for conservative Justices to move from government to
academic jobs (10% v. 5%), public interest to academic (6% v. 1%), and
academic to private practice (4% v. 2%).60 These findings suggest that
ideology operates on job choice, with academia and public interest work
generally the province of liberals.
As previously mentioned, the Bonus Baby Regime has given rise to
an elite group of law firms that compete for Supreme Court law clerks.61
Figure 14 lists the firms that have hired the most clerks directly from the
Supreme Court in recent years. Sidley Austin and WilmerHale are the
industry leaders, with each hiring 50 clerks—roughly 70% directly from
the Court—since the start of the Bonus Baby Regime in 1986. The next
group—Jones Day, Kirkland & Ellis, and Gibson Dunn—have hired
roughly 30 clerks during the same time period, nearly all of whom came
directly from the Court. The following group has hired roughly 20
clerks: Mayer Brown; O’Melveny & Myers; Jenner & Block; Kellogg
Huber Hansen; Latham & Watkins; Munger, Tolles & Olson; and
Williams & Connolly. The numbers continue to decline, with many
firms hiring only one or two clerks. In all, over the course of their
59. Kendall, supra note 28.
60. See supra Figure 13.
61. See supra notes 13–24 and accompanying text.
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careers, 563 clerks were hired by 90 different firms during the period
under study. Thus, the top five firms for employing former Supreme
Court clerks account for one-third (34%) of all hires. And the top
twelve firms account for well over half (58%) of all clerk hires.
Figure 14
Number of Clerks Hired by Law Firms:
First v. All Post-Clerkship Jobs, 1986–2011
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Figure 15
Number of Clerks Hired by Law Firms by Justice Ideology, 1986–201162

62. Justice ideology was determined by Martin-Quinn scores. Martin-Quinn Scores,
supra note 40.
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Does the growth in private practice employment mean that clerks
are less ideological in choosing careers than they once were? Figure 15
illustrates law firm employment by Justice ideology. The results are
striking. There is indeed a considerable ideological or partisan
difference in the law firms that clerks work for.
WilmerHale
overwhelmingly hires clerks who worked for liberal Justices (39) as
opposed to clerks who worked for conservative Justices (11). Similarly,
Jenner & Block skews liberal (16 v. 3) as do Munger, Tolles & Olson (12
v. 6) and O’Melveny & Myers (12 v. 8). Some firms essentially only hire
clerks who work for liberal Justices: Ropes & Gray (7 v. 1), Morrison &
Foerster (7 v. 0), and Debevoise & Plimpton (6 v. 0). Countering the
liberal juggernaut of WilmerHale are conservative bastions Sidley
Austin (13 clerks from liberal Justices v. 37 clerks from conservative
Justices), Kirkland & Ellis (3 v. 30), Jones Day (6 v. 27), and Gibson
Dunn (2 v. 25). A number of other firms skew conservative: Latham &
Watkins (5 v. 13), Kellogg Huber Hansen (7 v. 12), Mayer Brown (9 v.
12), Covington & Burling (5 v. 9), and Sullivan & Cromwell (3 v. 8).
Finally, there are firms that essentially only hire clerks from
conservative Justices, with one or two exceptions: Bartlit Beck (2 v. 11),
Hogan Lovells (1 v. 8), King & Spalding (2 v. 8), Baker Botts (2 v. 7),
and Bancroft (0 v. 7). There are only a few firms that have come close
to parity in hiring clerks from both liberal and conservative Justices:
Williams & Connolly (10 clerks from liberal Justices v. 8 clerks from
conservative Justices), Wachtell Lipton (4 v. 5), Davis Polk (4 v. 4), and
Skadden Arps (3 v. 4). Thus, the data make plain that ideology plays a
key role in the decision of law firms to hire Supreme Court law clerks.
IV. THE TWO-YEAR RULE:
LENGTH OF TIME IN POST-CLERKSHIP JOBS
Having paid off their loans, after a short time, some clerks leave
firms for academia or government work.63 Firms are acutely aware of
this possibility and attempt to distinguish between clerks who will be
short-timers and those who are likely to remain with the firm for a
longer period of time, if not indefinitely.64 There is an informal norm
that clerks work for their initial firm for at least two years before
making a switch.65 And while some firms pay the bonuses in
63. Supreme Desire, supra note 25.
64. Kendall, supra note 28.
65. Lane, supra note 20.
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installments or write contracts to require clerks to return part of their
bonuses should they leave early,66 it does not appear that they are
enforced—particularly if the clerk leaves for a government post as
opposed to switching to another firm, as clerks do return to firms after
government service. For example, 2010 Ginsburg clerk Keith Bradley
left WilmerHale less than one year after he was hired for a government
job in the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.67 Similarly, 2010
Thomas clerk Elbert Lin left Wiley Rein—a firm he had worked at as
an associate before his clerkship—short of the informal two-year mark
to become West Virginia’s solicitor general.68
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the length of time that
clerks stay in their first and second jobs. While there are instances of
clerks departing after only a single year or less, the modal length of time
for first jobs for both Rehnquist and Roberts Court clerks is two years.
Thus, it appears that the two-year rule is in fact the norm. Interestingly,
the modal length of time for second jobs for Rehnquist Court clerks was
also two years but only one year for Roberts Court clerks. This suggests
that Roberts Court clerks may be staying in their first jobs as long as
their predecessors did but may be willing to move more quickly from
their second positions. Figure 16 helps illuminate these findings by
comparing the length of time that Rehnquist and Roberts Court clerks
spent in their first jobs after leaving the Court. It is plain that the vast
majority of clerks leave their first jobs within a few years—consistent
with the descriptive statistics in Table 1. Yet, only 8% (16) of Roberts
Court clerks departed their first jobs after one year or less compared to
12% (51) of Rehnquist Court clerks. Though the data reflect only the
first eight years of the Roberts Court, they suggest that Roberts Court
clerks may be less likely to leave their first jobs early but more likely to
leave their second jobs more quickly than did past clerks. This may very
well be due to the strengthening of the informal—and now more
formal—two-year norm as increasing numbers of clerks choose private
practice for their first jobs.69 As second jobs are just as likely to be in

66. Will Baude, The Missing Part of the Washingtonian Signing Bonus Story, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 3, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/03/the-missing-partof-the-washingtonian-signing-bonus-story/, archived at http://perma.cc/7EZ8-YBHL.
67. Marisa M. Kashino, Hiring Supreme Court Clerks: The $500,000 Gamble,
WASHINGTONIAN, Aug. 2013, at 15.
68. Id.
69. See supra Figure 2.
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academia or the government as they are to be in another firm,70 former
clerks on the whole are less constrained by the two-year norm at that
stage.

Table 1
Length of Time in First and Second Post-Clerkship Jobs:
Descriptive Statistics, 1986–2011
Rehnquist
Court:
1st Job

Roberts
Court:
1st Job

1st
Job
Total

Rehnquist
Court:
2d Job

Roberts
Court:
2d Job

2d
Job
Total

Mean

7.27

3.57

6.12

6.12

3.29

6.26

Median

4

3

4

5

3

5

Mode

2

2

2

2

1

2

Minimum

1

1

1

1

1

1

Maximum

28

8

28

24

7

24

Standard
Deviation

6.76

1.85

5.96

5.49

1.84

5.31

N=

434

199

633

386

51

437

70. See supra Figure 12.
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Figure 16
Comparing the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Clerks:
Length of Time in First Post-Clerkship Job, 1986–2011
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V. CONCLUSION
The career paths of former Supreme Court law clerks have been
radically transformed in recent years. In 1986, the Natural Sorting
Regime—where clerks chose among private and public positions with
relatively similar salaries—gave way to the Bonus Baby Regime
characterized by escalating signing bonuses, ramped up recruiting by
select firms, and the rise of specialized appellate and Supreme Court
practices. Clerks have flocked to private practice in unprecedented
numbers due to both lucrative signing bonuses and a more conservative
clerking corps. Taking a position with one of the elite firms that recruit
clerks has become the rule, and working in academia, government, or
public interest the rare exception. But the vast majority of clerks leave
their first jobs within the first few years after they leave the Court.
Those who initially choose private practice leave in equal numbers for
another private practice position, a government job, or academia.
At the same time, the job choices of clerks also reflect ideological
considerations. Clerks who work for conservative Justices are more
likely to enter private practice than are clerks for liberal Justices.
Similarly, clerks for liberal Justices are more likely to enter government
or public interest jobs. The firms that heavily recruit former clerks do so
on partisan lines, with some firms dominated by clerks who worked for
conservative Justices and others populated by clerks for liberal Justices.
Thus, the new generation of Supreme Court law clerks is composed of
liberal and conservative bonus babies eager to don the golden handcuffs
of private practice for a couple years before thinking about their next
short-term posts either in another firm, government, or the academy.
When compared to the humble beginning of the clerkship institution—
or even the institution as it existed for most of the past century—the
power and status of Supreme Court law clerks has never been higher.

